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Foreword 
 
In comparison to phenomenon of micro-credit which started in a big way in India in 
the  90s,  micro-insurance  is  a  very  recent  phenomenon.  Micro-insurance,  that  basically 
refers to insurance for the low income people, is picking up in India. A strong interest in the 
development of micro-insurance in India comes from three different quarters. One is the 
growing evidence of a strong positive link between health security and poverty reduction; 
accordingly those involved in poverty alleviation are looking for way to address healthcare 
needs of the poor. Two, hard constraint on public budget is making the health financing 
specialists  explore  alternative  financing  mechanisms  such  as  insurance,  user  charges, 
revolving funds etc. Third, the imposition of social and rural obligations by the insurance 
regulator in post-reform phase of the Indian insurance market is necessitating insurance 
companies to develop products for the low-income segment of the market. The confluence 
of all three forces is leading to the development of micro-insurance India. 
 
Also,  micro-insurance  is  a  natural  extension  of  micro-credit  operations. 
Accordingly, microfinance agencies and organization are increasingly showing interest in 
micro-insurance, including micro health insurance. 
 
This analytical study charts the early development of micro-insurance in the country, 
with a focus on health insurance, mainly with the view to bring out certain issues that come 
up  in  the  design  of  micro  health  insurance.  The  findings  of  this research should be of 
interest to all the stakeholders. 
 






Director & Chief Executive 
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1  Introduction 
Although the type of risks faced by the poor such as that of death, illness, accident, 
old age etc. are no different from those faced by others, the poor are more vulnerable to 
such  risks.  Given  the  economic  circumstance  of  the  poor,  these  risks  have  a  special 
significance in their lives. These risks prevent them from breaking the vicious circle of 
poverty. Any poverty alleviation strategy must, therefore, enhance the ability of the poor to 
deal with risks (Holzmann and Jorgensen 2000, Siegel et al. 2001). Insurance is one of the 
risk management strategies. In the past insurance as a prepaid risk managing instrument was 
never considered an option for the poor. For one, the poor were considered too poor to be 
able to pay for insurance, and for other, they were considered uninsurable, given the variety 
of risks the poor face. However, recent developments in India, as elsewhere, have shown 
that not only can the poor contribute towards their insurance but also that they are insurable 
as  the  risks  they  face  are  predictable  and  there  are  cost-effective  ways  of  extending 
insurance to them. 
 
Micro insurance, the term that refers to insurance to the poor, is slowly picking up in 
India.
1 Of the 51 operational microinsurance schemes in India (enlisted in the recent ILO 
inventory (2004)), 25 schemes came up during the last 4 years alone. Historically, a few 
microinsurance  schemes  (around  8  schemes  have  operated  for  7  years  or  more)  were 
initiated either by the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) due to the felt need of the 
communities in which these organisations were involved or by the trust hospitals. However, 
the  recent  momentum  behind  these  schemes  is  partly  due  to  the  development  of 
microfinance activity in the country and partly in response to the regulatory requirement 
that makes it mandatory for all insurance companies (whether public or private and whether 
in life or non-life segment) to extend their activities to rural and well-identified social sector 
                                                            
1   Microinsurance is relatively a new term used to refer to insurance services that are specifically aimed at 
the poor, delivered through a nodal agency (as in the case of micro credit), and that involve modest 
premium and coverage amount. Microinsurance is also referred to as community based insurance. An ILO 
Report (2000) defines microinsurance schemes as schemes set up by self-employed and informal economy 
workers to meet their priority social protection needs. The mechanism used in these schemes is generally 
the provision of mutual support through the pooling of resources based on the principles of insurance.”   2 
in the country (IRDA 2000). As a result, increasingly microfinance institutions (MFIs) and 
NGOs are negotiating microinsurance schemes with the for-profit insurers for the purchase 
of customized group insurance policies. For MFIs, integrating insurance with their credit 
and savings activities makes logical sense as it helps them reap scale economies in financial 
management, provides them with a captive market, and enables them to use their existing 
network and distribution channels to sell insurance. Indeed, most insurance schemes (66%) 
are linked with micro finance services provided by specialised institutions (16 schemes) or 
non-specialised organisations (15 schemes). Health care providers implement only 12% of 
the schemes. 
 
Although  the  microinsurance  schemes  in  India  cover  a  variety  of risks, life and 
health are the two most popular risks for which insurance is demanded. Fifty nine percent 
of microinsurance schemes operational in India provide for life insurance, and 57 percent of 
the schemes provide for health insurance.
2 In SEWA’s
3 experience health insurance tops 
the list of risks for which the poor need insurance.
4 
 
Few  studies  have  tried  to  measure  the  effectiveness  of  health  schemes  in  India. 
While microinsurance schemes do mobilise significant amount by way of premium from 
members,  improve  their  access  to  health  services,  and  spread  health  awareness,  these 
schemes  suffer  from  certain  weakness,  for  example,  they  depend  on  external  funding, 
exclude the poorest of the poor, and often suffer from poor design (Ranson 2004). Although 
these schemes cover only around 2.6 million beneficiaries their potential is viewed to be 
considerable (ILO 2003). 
 
                                                            
2   Many MFIs and NGOs are in the process of introducing health insurance. 
3   SEWA is a labour union of informal economy women workers based in Ahmedabad city of Gujarat. It 
was started by Ela Bhatt. Its operations now run in other states such as Madhya Pradesh, Delhi, Bihar, 
Kerala and Gujarat. 
4   In comparison to life insurance which is a fairly straightforward business (as death is once in a lifetime 
event and proving it is much easier), health insurance is much more complicated. This could perhaps be 
the reason why we observe higher number of life insurance than health insurance schemes.   3 
The need for health insurance for the poor has arisen because illness is found to be 
one of the important causes of their impoverishment. In the event of illness the poor (for 
whom wage income is the predominant source) not only forgo their income but have to 
dissave, borrow or run down their assets for meeting hospitalization costs. According to a 
World  Bank study (by Peters et al. 2002), about one-fourth of hospitalised Indians fall 
below the poverty line as a result of their hospital stays. Similarly, more than 40 percent of 
hospitalised  patients  take  loans  or  sell  assets  to  pay  for  hospitalisation.  Similarly,  the 
baseline survey carried out by the Centre for Population Dynamics (CPD) in 2 different 
districts of Karnataka corroborated the findings of the World Bank study. In particular, 
CPD found that people in those 2 districts faced significant financial barriers in seeking 
medical care as loans constituted the single largest source for meeting costs of illness and 
hospitalization, followed by sale of livestock (Karuna Trust 2003).
5 Such high percentage is 




Although, in principal, government provides for free primary and secondary health 
care  services  to  the  poor,  in  practice  the quality of primary health services is far from 
satisfactory, and that secondary services are not easily accessible.
7 As a result the poor end 
up spending significant percentage of their income for meeting their health care needs. If 
the poor must pay to get quality health care services, then there is a case for strengthening 
their demand so as to enable them to buy such services. Income generation activities for the 
poor, of course, help in strengthening their demand for health care. But even at their current 
                                                            
5   Around 52 percent of cost of illness and 43 percent of hospitalization expenses were met through loans. 
Similarly, around 13 percent of illness cost and 17 percent of hospitalization expenses were met through 
sale of livestock.  
6   SHEPHERD found out that 40 per cent of its internal loans have been availed by their borrowers for 
curative purposes. 
7   Public spending accounts for only about 0.9 percent of GDP which is highly inadequate. Moreover, even 
this limited public spending is not just on primary care, the benefit of which accrues mostly to the poor, 
but  also  on  secondary  and  tertiary  care,  which  also  benefit  the  already  well  off  sections  of  society. 
Furthermore, much of the private health spending is out-of-pocket expenditure and does not take the form 
of  prepaid  risk  pooling  arrangement.  The  burden  of  in  case  of  out-of-pocket  expenditure  falls 
disproportionately on the poor.   4 
income  levels,  health  insurance  by  spreading  the  cost  of  illness  among  all  the  insured 
members can help in reducing the financial burden of treatment of those who fall ill, and 
thereby, helps in building demand. 
 
Health insurance for the poor is different from the health insurance in general in at 
least 4 ways. First, in case of a poor individual, the size or the extent of insurance coverage 
is not a choice variable. Individuals cannot choose coverage level at a given price or decide 
on the risks against which to buy insurance, as is generally the case with health insurance.  
The poor are offered an insurance package that includes price, benefits and defines the 
method of paying premium and settling claims. All that they decide is whether or not to join 
the scheme. In other words, insurance package only influences the purchase decision i.e., 
whether or not to buy (standard) insurance package but not how much coverage to buy or 
what risks to include. Price is based on community rating and not on individual rating. 
Health insurance in case of the poor is generally a group contract mediated through or 
managed by a nodal agency. 
 
Second, in case of health insurance for the poor, some level of subsidy or external 
funding  is  necessary  for  ensuring  sustainability  of  schemes.  According  to  the  ILO 
inventory,  nearly  50  percent  of  the  schemes  (i.e.,  25  schemes)  received  a  financial 
assistance to initiate their activities.
8 A review of 10 health insurance schemes for the poor 
in India also confirms this point (Ranson 2004). This gives rise to a number of issues such 
as: what level of subsidy, in what form, and, to what agency? 
 
Third, health insurance does not remove all financial barriers to access health care. 
Often there are many indirect costs such as wage loss, transportation costs, incidental costs 
during hospital stay and so forth. This is not to suggest that people who are not poor do not 
have to bear these costs. What distinguishes the poor from non-poor is that these costs often 
                                                            
8   Besides financial assistance, the schemes also need some technical assistance. In the ILO inventory, 20 
schemes benefited from some external technical assistance.   5 
prevent the poor from seeking medical care. So, a careful design of scheme must try to 
minimise  these  other  financial  as  well  as  non-financial  barriers.  Indeed,  a  few  health 
insurance schemes explicitly provide for wage loss to enable the poor to seek treatment. 
Moreover, mechanism of premium collection and claim settlement itself can act as a barrier 
to join a scheme. A flexible method of collecting premium is needed for people who have 
low and fluctuating income. Similarly, prompt/direct claims settlement in case of the poor 
who lack credit facility assumes special significance in case of the poor. 
 
Fourth,  designing  health  insurance  system  involves  strengthening  health  care 
provision as well. Providing health insurance is meaningless if the health facility is weak. A 
weak facility dissuades individuals from joining the scheme and this also has a bearing on 
cost  of  illness.  Provision  of  health  care of reasonable quality cannot be assumed when 
initiating health insurance for the poor. Often, good quality services are not available within 
reasonable  distance.  So  initiating  health  insurance  in  case  of  the  poor  also  involves 
strengthening the supply side. 
 
To the extent health insurance helps in removing financial barrier to seeking health 
care, it is desirable. However, providing insurance to the poor can be prohibitively costly. 
Neither  government  provided  nor  market  mediated  insurance  is  appropriate  way  of 
providing insurance to the poor as both these are too costly. An institutional innovation that 
makes delivery of insurance cost-effective is the only way of extending insurance to the 
poor. This innovation lies in finding an intermediate agency that can organise the poor and 
perform some (or all) of the activities normally carried out by an insurance company. 
 
The  development  of  microinsurance  in  India  has  shown  how  insurance  can  be 
extended to the poor in India in a cost-effective way. But the mechanism for providing 
insurance is different from the usual formal, market-based insurance. In particular, while 
principle  of  advance  payment  of  premium  for  covering  risks  that  may  arise  in  future 
remains the same, many of the activities normally performed by an insurance provider are   6 
undertaken by a nodal agency whose role is deemed essential in extending the reach of 
insurance to the poor as it able to perform variety of activities in cost-effective way. This 
way micro insurance combines positive features of both formal insurance (by organising it 
scientifically) as well as informal insurance (by using local information and resources that 
helps in designing appropriate scheme at reduced costs). In this paper we bring out the role 
of  nodal  agency  in  providing  insurance  to  the  poor.  Besides,  we  identify  and  examine 
important conceptual issues that come up in different types of microinsurance arrangements 
emerging in the country. Analysis of these issues is needed for better understanding of these 
schemes,  and  this  should  help  in  their  design  as  well  as  in  devising  an  appropriate 
government policy. 
 
The paper is organised as follow: in the next section we highlight the role of nodal 
agency in extending insurance to the poor; in section 3, besides highlighting the different 
microinsurance  arrangements  in  the  country,  we  identify  and  study  various  conceptual 
issues that come up under alternate microinsurance arrangements emerging in the country; 
in section 4 we bring out the role of public policy in developing microinsurance in the 
country; and section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2  Role of nodal agency 
Organising the poor, also referred to as social intermediation, is essential not just for 
providing insurance but for carrying out any kind of development activity designed for the 
poor. An intermediate agency, or a nodal agency, that works for the upliftment of the poor 
performs this important function. In the absence of a nodal agency, social organisation of 
the  poor  can  be  quite  costly.  A  nodal  agency  could  be  any  of  the  civil  society 
associations/organizations  such  as  community  based  organisations,  women’s  groups, 
informal  economy  trade  unions,  NGOs,  micro  finance  institutions,  micro-entrepreneurs 
associations and so forth. That a majority of microinsurance schemes (76 percent) in the 
ILO inventory are developed in the four southern states of India should not come as a 
surprise.  The southern states are known for their better social organisation. A nodal agency   7 
generally has an intimate knowledge of the needs and priorities of the community, in which 
they work and also enjoys the trust of the local people. This local knowledge is essential in 
designing  appropriate  insurance  scheme  as  well  as  appropriate  delivery  mechanism.  In 
addition, a nodal agency can mobilize external funding. 
 
In  the  context  of  health  insurance,  a  nodal  agency  performs  several  functions 
typically carried out by an insurance company. The presence of a nodal agency results in (i) 
lowering of transaction costs (ii) designing a scheme suited to the community needs, and 
(iii) influencing the supply of health care. We expand on each of these below. 
 
The  strength  of  microinsurance  lies  in  lowering  transaction  costs.  Popularising 
insurance among low-income people, who are also not well educated and informed, is often 
not  an  easy  task.  Conveying  the  idea,  canvassing  it,  collecting  premium,  verifying  and 
reimbursing  claims  often  takes  up  significant  portion  of  the  premium  costs.  In  case  of 
formal insurance contracts, these costs are well in excess of 15-20 percent of premium. In 
case of insurance to the poor, these costs as a percentage of premium are likely to be higher 
because of small valued transactions. A nodal agency having a team of committed social 
workers is able to perform the functions in a cost-effective way. At times, scheme members 
themselves are entrusted with some of the functions in running of a scheme.
9 Besides, a 
nodal agency also plays a crucial role in design of insurance scheme. 
 
A careful design of schemes depending on characteristics of the target community 
helps  in  removing  many  other  financial  and  non-financial  barriers.  Additionally,  the 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard that arise due to informational asymmetries 
too can be mitigated through careful design and implementation of the scheme by making 
use of local knowledge that is readily available among people living in close communities. 
In a few existing schemes in India, a nodal agency provides credit that enables the members 
                                                            
9   Even  social  workers  who  spread  insurance  awareness  need  to  be  trained.  Expanding  microinsurance 
requires building capacities of the nodal agencies as well.   8 
of local community to pay premium and join insurance scheme. In some cases, the premium 
is collected in “soft form” such as in the form of labour service, agricultural produce and/or 
small amounts collected more frequently. 
 
Also, presence of a nodal agency helps in influencing provision of health services 
and negotiating the prices and other conditions with the health providers. By this reckoning, 
standard policies that are not tailored to the needs of the community cannot be hoped to be 
very  successful.  Jan  Arogya  and  Universal  Health  Insurance  are  the  standard  health 
insurance schemes of the public insurers for the poor. These schemes do not seek to achieve 
the  benefits  typically  associated with the involvement of nodal agencies, and also such 
schemes more prone to abuse. 
 
3  Types of Microinsurance Arrangements 
Depending  on  the  nature  of  functions  performed  by  a  nodal  agency,  one  could 
categorise  all  microinsurance  schemes  into  three  types  (Ranson  2004).  Type  I  scheme 
where a nodal agency is an intermediary between a formal insurance provider and the target 
community (SEWA in Ahmedabad, ACCORD in Nilgiris are good examples of this type of 
schemes). Almost all MFIs and also some NGOs perform the role of an intermediary.
10 
Type II scheme where a Community Based Organisation (CBO) or an NGO manages the 
scheme in-house with an arrangement with a health provider (for example Tribhuvandas 
Foundation in Gujarat, Yeshwani in Karnataka). Type III scheme where the health care 
provider itself initiates and runs an insurance scheme (as in case of Sewagram Hospital in 
                                                            
10   Around 33 percent of the schemes are initiated by microfinance organisations (MFIs), 27 percent by 
NGOs and 20 percent of CBO, and 12 percent by health providers, and remaining by others. Sixty-nine 
percent of schemes have already developed partnerships with insurance companies (42 percent with public 
insurance companies and 27 percent with private companies).   9 
Maharashtra, Voluntary Health Services (VHS) in Chennai).
  11 All these forms currently 
exist in the country but only in small pockets.
12 
 
A number of conceptual issues come up in these different types of microinsurance 
schemes. Some of the important ones relate to (i) transaction costs (ii) membership size (or 
the size of risk pool) (iii) in-patient and out-patient care (iv) informational problems (v) unit 
of insurance (vi) maternity insurance, and (vii) benefit on provision side. 
 
But not all these issues are equally prominent in all types of microinsurance. For 
example, size of membership (or size of risk pool) is likely to be a much more significant 
issue in a scheme managed in-house (Type II scheme) than when it is bought from an 
insurance  company.  Similarly,  while  high  drop-out  rate  is  an  important  issue  in  the 
intermediary type of (Type I) scheme, it is unlikely to be the case where scheme is managed 
in-house. This is because the solidarity is likely to be greater in a scheme that is managed 
in-house than when it is bought from a formal insurer. Similarly, including outpatient care 
is not an issue in the provider type (Type III) scheme, whereas it is so in the intermediate 
(Type I) scheme. In this section we discuss selected issues that are likely to be important in 
each type of microinsurance. The table below gives a snapshot view of selected conceptual 
issues that come up in alternate microinsurance arrangements in India: 
 
                                                            
11   A review of 10 community based health insurance schemes in India identifies schemes of these three 
types. For review of these schemes see Ranson 2004. 
12   Besides these types, there is another type of health insurance scheme for the poor but this scheme cannot 
strictly be considered as microinsurance scheme. This is the Jan Arogya policy offered by the non-life 
public insurance companies. This policy is like any other market based contract, except the fact that the 
terms of the contract have been decided by the government since the contract is meant for the low-income 
people.  A  similar  scheme,  called  universal  health  insurance  for  the  poor  (UHI),  has  been  launched 
recently, and it also fits into this category. Even though the scheme seeks to involve NGOs in representing 
a group, the schemes do not really try to exploit the potential of nodal agencies.  10 
Table 1 : Conceptual Issues in Alternate Microinsurance Arrangements in India 
 
Nature of issues  
 
(Examples) 
























Low-medium  Low  Low  Medium 
(ii) Membership 
Size (size of risk 
pool)  
Not an issue  Is an important 
issue 
Is an important 
issue 
Not an issue 
(iii) Inpatient/ 
Outpatient Care 
Is an issue  Is an issue  Is NOT an 
issue 
Is an issue 
(iv) Benefit on 
provision side 
Negligible  Low  Significant  Low 
(v)  Loss/ Risk 
Reduction  
Negligible   Significant  Significant  Negligible 
(vi)Informational 
Problems 
Is an issue   May be an 
issue 
Not an issue  Is an issue 
(vii) Maternity 
Benefit  
Is an issue  Not an issue  Not an issue  Is an issue 
Source: Own Compilation 
 
(i) Transaction Costs: When providing insurance to the low-income people or those in a 
low  resource  context,  transaction  costs  become  crucial  in  all  types  of  insurance 
arrangements. One of the strengths of microinsurance scheme is that such costs can be 
contained. The magnitude of these costs can make the whole difference between being able 
or not being able to afford insurance. 
 
The  effect  of  high  transaction  costs  is  that  it  tends  to  make  insurance  scheme 
unattractive, and this shows up in fewer members joining an insurance scheme. Of course, 
lower membership could be due to several reasons, high transaction costs being just one of 
these. Indeed low membership is a problem in many existing schemes. SEWA, for example, 
has over 5 lakh members and only around 1 lakh members (i.e., around 20 percent) are part 
                                                            
13   The  fourth  column does not represent a microinsurance scheme. It is mentioned just for the sake of 
comparison.  11 
of its insurance scheme. Similarly, FWWB has an outreach to 8,00,000 members but only 
17.9 percent of the members currently participate in microinsurance against any kind of 
risk.
14 Still, a very small percent of the insured members FWWB have health insurance. 
Ranson (2004) reports inverse relationship between the size of target community and the 
subscription rate i.e., smaller target communities tend to have higher subscription rate. 
 
We demonstrate below how high transaction costs might discourage people from 
joining insurance scheme even when it benefits them, and in such situation why people 
might prefer savings to buying insurance. 
 
Consider  a  two-period  model  in  which  a  typical  risk  averse  individual  faces  no 
uncertainty in the first period and therefore has a fixed given income Y. In the second 
period,  however,  the  individual  (or  household)  has  random  income.  For  simplicity  we 
assume that there are only two possible states of nature: a good state in which the individual 
income is y and a bad state in which his income is Y-L. The bad state in the current context 
is the state of the individual falling sick.
15 The probability of the bad state is denoted by p. 
The risk averse behaviour is captured by the restriction on the utility function, U, that is by 
its strict concavity (i.e., U’>0 and U’’<0). Expected utility of the individual in the absence 




For simplicity, the discount factor is assumed to be 1 (unity).
16 
                                                            
14   FWWB (Friends of Women World Banking) has a network of 96 partner organisations that provides loans 
to its partner organisation who inturn provide micro-credit to the low-income people. Besides providing 
credit, the network is moving into providing other financial services such as savings and insurance. 
15   In case of illness, the individual not only suffers income loss but also loss on account of having to bear 
cost of illness (i.e., of medicines etc.). In the model we do not distinguish between these two costs and 
treat the entire loss to be insurable. 
16   This is a simplifying assumption that implies that the future is as much dearer to the individual as is the 
present.  12 
 
Supposing  the  insurance  contract  available  to  the  agent  is:  buy  any  amount  of 
coverage in period 1 at actuarially fair price p
17, and get the coverage amount reimbursed in 
period 2 if the loss state shows up.  
 
Given this contract, if the agent faces no borrowing constraint, he would buy full 
insurance.  From  the  standard  result  on  insurance  literature,  at  actuarially fair price, the 
utility maximising individual would demand full insurance coverage (see Mas-Colell et al. 
1995, pp. 187-188). His expected utility would be: 
 
U(Y-p L+B) + U(Y-B),  
 
where B denotes borrowings.  
 
The optimal borrowing B* would equalise agent’s utility in the two periods. This 
happens at B*=pL/2. Substituting this value of B* would give agent’s utility after he has 
purchased insurance: 2U(Y-pL/2). 
 
The agent’s behaviour may depart from above if insurance premium is actuarially 
unfair and/or the agent faces borrowing constraint. To highlight each of these aspects we 
consider two situations: (a) when price of insurance is actuarially unfair, but the agent has 
access to credit; (b) when the price of insurance is actuarially fair, but the agent doesn’t 
have access to credit. In both these cases, the agent may not buy insurance. We consider 
each of these situations below. 
 
(a) When price of insurance is actuarially unfair but the agent has access to credit: 
Normally, in this situation if the agent has an option to choose coverage level, he may still 
                                                            
17   Actuarially fair price is the price at which insurance company selling insurance makes zero-expected 
profits. This condition characterises competitive insurance market. In the absence of zero transaction 
costs, the actuarially fair price is the same as probability of bad state showing up.   13 
buy  insurance  but  the  coverage  would  be  partial.  In  case  of  micro-insurance  there  is 
additional complication which is that the agent may not get to choose the coverage level; he 
is offered a fixed insurance contract and his decision variable is whether or not to buy this 
given contract. 
 
In such situation too, the agent would buy insurance (if affordability issue does not 
kicks in) if the price is actuarially fair (i.e., when P = p L) but if the price of insurance is 
unfair the individual may or may not buy insurance. There are two possibilities here: if the 
price is very high, the agent will be better off not buying insurance at all; and, if the price of 
insurance is not very high, but is still actuarially unfair, the agent may not buy insurance, 
and may instead prefer to self-insure (i.e., set aside some savings for future) even when 
buying insurance makes him better off. We demonstrate this below: 
 
Let P’ denote actuarially unfair price. If buying insurance yields higher utility than 
not buying insurance the following condition would hold. 
 
[U(Y)+ (1-p)U(Y)+pU(Y-L)] < [U(Y-P’)+ U(Y)] 
 
The term on the left-hand side of the inequality is agent’s expected utility in the 
absence of insurance whereas the term on the right-hand side denotes utility after buying 
insurance. If the agent has access to credit market, the agent can do better by equalising his 
income in the two periods i.e.,  
 
U(Y-P’) + U(Y) < U(Y-P’+B) + U(Y-B), where B denotes (interest-free) borrowings 
 
As in the above, the optimal borrowing would be P’/2.  
 
Given this, the level of P may be such that it may be better for the agent to not buy 
insurance and save (or self-insure) instead i.e.,    14 
 
U(Y-P’+B)+ U(Y-B) < U(Y-S)+ (1-p)U(Y+S)+p U(Y-L+S) 
 
In other words, even if buying insurance is utility enhancing for the agent, the agent 
may  be  better  off  self-insuring  i.e.,  by  setting  aside  some  savings  rather  than  buying 
insurance. And, if the agent doesn’t have easy access to credit which is more likely to be 
true in the context of poor, there is greater likelihood of the above condition (where agent 
prefers saving instead of buying insurance) holding true. A simple numerical example can 
demonstrate such a plausible situation. 
 
Supposing: U(Y) = √100, L=36, p= 0.5. 
 
In  the  absence  of  insurance  the  expected  utility  of  the  agent  is:  U(Y)+  (1-
p)U(Y)+pU(Y-L) = √100 + (0.5) √100 + (0.5) √(100-36) = 10 + (0.5) 10 + (0.5) 8 = 19. 
 
If insurance is available to the agent at actuarially fair price his utility would be: 
U(Y) + U(Y-pL) = √100 + √(100 –(0.5) 36)  = 10 + 9.0554  = 19.0554. If the agent could 
borrow against his future income, his utility would increase to: 19.07878 (when he is able 
to equalise income in both periods). 
 
Now, suppose that insurance is available to the agent but at unfair price resulting in 
premium of 18.9. The utility he gets from buying insurance at this premium is: U(Y) + 
U(Y-18.9) = 10 + 9.0056 = 19.0056. If he is allowed to borrow against his future income, 
his utility would be U(Y-9.45) + U(Y-9.45) = 9.5157+9.5157= 19.03155. Even when the 
agent  is  better  off  buying  insurance,  we  show  below  that  the  agent  may  still  not  buy 
insurance simply because self-insurance is more attractive option. 
 
Instead of buying insurance, if this individual were to save some money in the first 
period to be used for second period, his utility would be: U(Y-S)+ (1-p)U(Y+S)+p U(Y- 15 
L+S). It is easy to check that optimal savings would be 10.4 (the one that equalises marginal 
utilities  in  the  two  periods).  At  this  level  of  saving  his  utility  is :  √(100-10.4)  +  (0.5) 
√(100+10.4) + (0.5) √(100-36+10.4) = 9.4657+(0.5) 10.507 + (0.5) 8.6255 = 19. 03207 (> 
19.03155). 
 
If, in addition, the agent doesn’t have borrowing option which is likely to be true in 
case  of  the  poor,  the  difference  in  the  utilities  in  the  two  cases  (of  buying  insurance 
(19.0056) and saving (19.03207)) will be significant, thereby influencing the membership 
of any insurance program. 
 
The above case is outlined to highlight the role of transaction costs. 
18 When the 
coverage level is fixed and not in agent’s control, the presence of transaction costs reduces 
the decision to buy or not buy the package (and not how much insurance to buy). The 
presence of transaction costs can make buying an insurance package unattractive for the 
agent  and  the  agent  may  prefer  other  risk  management  strategies  such  as  savings  to 
insurance  (for  a  diagrammatic  exposition  of  this  issue  see  the  Appendix).  Even  if 
transaction costs are partly subsidised, agent may still not buy insurance and may prefer to 
save instead. But the purchase decision depends not just on the price of insurance but also 
on whether or not the poor has access to credit. We explain this below:  
 
(b) When price of insurance is actuarially fair but the agent doesn’t have access to 
credit:  In  this  situation  too  the  agent  may  not  buy  insurance  if  he  is  already  close  to 
subsistence. 
 
We continue with the above assumptions about agent’s behaviour. However, let his 
second period income now be Y+z in the good state and Y-z in the bad state. The bad state 
                                                            
18   Note also that transaction costs need not always take the form of higher premium. It could take non-
financial forms as well. For example, if there is difficulty in getting claims reimbursed, then this may 
actually tilt the balance in favour of savings that can be re-called with greater ease rather than getting a 
claim reimbursed.  16 
in the current context is the state of the individual falling sick. Furthermore, we now assign 
specific value to the probability. Let the probability of the bad state, denoted as p, be 0.5. 
 
EU=U(Y)+ 1/2 {U(Y-z)+U(Y+z)} 
 
Notice that the income loss suffered by the individual in period 2 should the bad 
state show up, is 2z, and we continue to assume the discount factor to be 1 (unity).
19 
 
Let’s first consider the case where the individual faces no borrowing constraint. As 
noted above at actuarially fair price and with no borrowing constraint the agent would buy 




where,  B  represents  borrowings  by  the  individual.  Since  we  have  assumed  no 
borrowings  constraint,  the  optimal  borrowing  is  one  that  equalises  income  in  the  two 
periods. This occurs when B*=z. Substituting B* in the above condition equation yields 
EU*=2U(Y). 
 
Since the paper deals specifically with the demand for insurance by the poor, we 
characterise them by the assumption that they are at (or close to) their subsistence level in 
the current period (i.e., period 1), and face credit constraint which is a well known fact 
about the poor in the developing world. An important implication of this assumption is that 
the poor cannot spare much, if at all, from their current income for insuring their future. Let 
C  denote  the  minimum  consumption  needed  by  the  individual  the  keep  him  at  the 
subsistence level. In the above construct, let the relationship between C, Y and z be defined 
by the condition, Y-z < C= Y. What this condition implies is that the individual is just able 
                                                            
19   This is a simplifying assumption that implies that the future is as much dearer to the individual as is the 
present.  17 
to meet his minimum consumption (defined by C) in period 1. In period 2, the individual 
runs the risk of falling below his subsistence level (or the poverty line) in case the bad state 
shows  up.  In  this  case,  if  the  individual cannot borrow at all, he will not demand any 
insurance. However, if the individual could borrow, he would demand insurance, yielding 
utility EU*=2U(Y). By buying insurance the individual is able to keep himself afloat the 
poverty line (i.e., able to meet minimum consumption needs in both periods).
20  
 
This  is  the  situation  in  which  people  are  aware  of  the  benefits  of  purchasing 
insurance but cannot set aside any money from their current income for this purpose. Faced 
with this situation, if cost of borrowing is not so high as to close the borrowing option, the 
agent  would  borrow  to  pay  premium.  In  reality,  borrowing  for  insurance  need  not 
necessarily take the form of actually taking credit at the prevailing interest rate. In fact, 
many  schemes  are  so  designed  as  to  take  account  of  this  fact.  For  example,  flexible 
premium option is one of the ways of addressing this issue. Creating a common pool of 
funds that can be used to give soft loans to group members is another way. Although the 
literature on microinsurance is thin, there is some evidence already available to this effect. 
In  fact,  many  micro-finance  organisations  dealing  with  savings  and  credit  have  been 
successful in introducing and running micro-insurance schemes.
21 
 
(ii) Membership Size and Risk Diversification: In microinsruance schemes in India, the size 
of membership varies widely from less than one thousand to more than 50,000 members 
(ILO 2003). The size of membership is crucial for diversifying health risk by enlarging the 
size of risk pool. This issue becomes important when a scheme is managed in-house by a 
nodal agency (Type II scheme). A large group size tends to make the scheme viable and 
sustainable.  Given  the  size  of  membership,  if  the  actual  loss  significantly  exceeds  the 
average loss, it can put the scheme in trouble as the collection by way of premium would 
                                                            
20   For a case where agent is free to decide on the coverage level is explored in Ahuja and Jütting (2004). 
21   The ILO Compendium of micro insurance schemes in India shows that about one-third of the insurance 
schemes are initiated by micro finance organisations.  18 
fall short of the claims thereby subjecting the scheme to financial stress. If this stress is 
large enough the scheme may break down. Where the scheme is managed by a health care 
provider size of membership beyond a decent number defined by the capacity of the health 
facility is not that critical. In case a scheme is bought from a formal insurance provider the 
size of membership is not an issue at all.  
 
Based on the need to diversify risk and the transaction costs involved, one can map 




















The figure above shows the distribution of groups according to their size. The shape 
of the distribution is immaterial. What is of significance here is the fact that different types 
of insurance arrangements are appropriate for the groups of different sizes. Depending on 
their  size,  we  divide  groups  into  three  broad  categories:  small  (represented  by  zone  I), 
medium (zone II) and large (zone III). When a group is very large, say greater than N2 (lying 
in zone III) it is best if the group members self-insure themselves or have an in-house 
insurance  program.  A  recent  health  insurance  scheme  called  Yeshwani,  started  in 
Karnataka, has membership of over one (1) million individuals. The scheme is managed in-
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house. Although this scheme has barely one year old, the early figures suggest that the 
scheme may not have difficulty break-even. 
 
On the other extreme, if the size of a group is very small, then running insurance 
program  in-house  would  be  least  effective.  Even  buying  insurance  from  an  insurance 
company would not be cost-effective. In the extreme case, it would tantamount to selling 
insurance to an individual. Writing separate contract for each insured individual is costly 
for  the  low-income  buyers.  Hence  the  idea  of  writing  a  single  contract  for  a  group  of 
persons. 
 
In  cases  where  group  is  small  but  covers  a  large  percentage  of  population  of  a 
region, an insurance scheme developed by a health care provider it most appropriate. For 
example,  for  sparsely  populated  rural  areas  where  people  live  in  cluster  of  villages  a 
healthcare  provider  scheme  would  be  more  suited.  Alternatively,  smaller  groups  can 
federate  themselves  into  a  bigger  group  and  then  have  a  contract  from  an  insurance 
company.  For  smaller  groups  of  10  to  20  members,  schemes  that  are  bought  from  an 
insurance company would be expensive due to high transaction costs. In schemes managed 
by healthcare providers there are limits to the membership as its reach is limited only to the 
people within certain geographical limits. For groups of medium size, it is preferable to buy 
insurance from an insurance company. That way, it can pass on the risk to an insurance 
company at an affordable price. 
 
An insurance scheme with small number of members managed in-house can at best 
provide for outpatient care. But for inpatient care, it has to be with a formal insurance 
provider  if  it  is  to  be  successful.  Membership  size  also  has  effect  on  reaping  scale 
economies which could be due to lowering of transaction costs, getting a better deal from a 
health care provider and/or from an insurance provider. The ultimate effect of this is in 
lowering of premium. We demonstrate below an important aspect that must be kept in mind  20 
while  designing  an  in-house  scheme  that  can,  to  some extent, reduce the need for risk 
diversification where membership is small. 
 
Financial sustainability is an important issue in a scheme managed in-house as well 
in  the  provider  type  scheme.  There  are  at  least  three  ways  of  ensuring  financial 
sustainability: one obvious way is to increase the size of pool, second way is to reinsure the 
risk, and the third way which is not recognised enough is to bundle the insured risks in such 
a way as to make aggregate loss more certain. The first two ways are well-understood. It is 
the third point which deals with bringing maximum certainty into aggregate loss that needs 
elaboration. If, for example two risks are negatively correlated, both these risks could be 
covered by the scheme. So the starting point of any micro-insurance should be to cover 
those risks that add stability into aggregate losses and to increase the size of pool. Later, as 
reinsurance  facility  becomes  available,  other  risks  can  be  added.  We  elaborate  on  this 
below. 
 
Providing insurance in a society would be much less complicated if the aggregate 
loss,  sum  of  individual  losses,  were  fixed  and  known  and  the  only  uncertainty  is  with 
respect to the individuals experiencing this loss. In a society of N identical individuals, if M 
individuals  were  to  experience  loss  every  period,  then  each  member  would  contribute 
premium just enough to cover the aggregate loss, which is the sum of loss to M individuals. 
Premium collection in any period would match disbursements on account of claims. Each 
period would be independent of next or the previous period and this exercise could be 
repeated  period  after  period.  In  such  a  society  there  would  be  no  scope  for  risk 
diversification  or  reinsurance.  In  other  words,  such  a  society  will  not  do  any better by 
joining hands with another identical society. The risk is fully contained in the society and 
the best it can do is to spread the risk among all its members through insurance. Assuming 
the members to be risk averse, each member would be better off as he or she would be able 
to  convert  uncertain  income  prospects  into  certain  prospects  thus  improving  his  or  her 
welfare.  21 
 
To illustrate with example, supposing there are two individuals in a society, one of 
whom incurs loss L for sure. But which of the two individuals incur this loss is uncertain. In 
this example the loss probability facing each individual is 0.5. In the absence of any deal 
between  the  two  individuals  with  respect  handling  of  the  risk,  expected  utility  of  each 
individual would be: 0.5 U(Y)+0.5 U(Y-L) (we are assuming single period model here). 
However,  both  the  individuals  can  be  better  off  if  they  eliminate  this  uncertainty  by 
deciding to share the loss equally. In that case, each agent’s utility would be: U(Y-L/2). 
 
Note that in the above example, L is fixed and therefore there is no scope for further 
risk diversification by joining hands with identical 2-individual society. The scope for risk 
diversification arises when the aggregate loss itself is not certain. Continuing with the same 
example, supposing that in a 2-individual society, each individual were to incur a loss of L 
with  probability  0.5.  The  difference  between  this  society  and  the  previous  2-individual 
society is that in this society there are 4 possible states: none of them incur the loss, either 
of them incur the loss, both of them incur the loss. The individuals would be better off 
joining hands but they can now share loss only when one of them incur loss. In situations 
where none of them incur the loss or both of them incur loss, there can be no sharing of 
risk. In this case, expected utility of each agent would be: 
 
Society I :   EU = (1-p)
2 U(Y) + 2(1-p) p U(Y-L/2) + p
2 U(Y-L) 
              --------------     ----------------------   ---------- 
         1      2    3   
 
 
Society II :   EU = (1-p)
2 U(Y) + 2(1-p) p U(Y-L/2) + p
2 U(Y-L) 
               ----------         ----------------------     ---------- 
      1      2    3   
 
where, numbers 1,2 and 3 refer to different states of nature. 
 
When the loss itself is uncertain, the wealth of the society is also uncertain. The 
society would definitely be better off by joining hands with another identical society and  22 
diversify risk. Both the societies can then cover for the possibility where both individuals in 
one of the two societies incur loss (i.e., by sharing risk in state (1,3) or (3,1)). The loss can 
then be shared between the two societies. Since the loss in both societies is still uncertain, 
there is scope for further risk diversification, until each member is assured of wealth (Y-p L) 
independent of the state of nature. 
 
This fact highlights how uncertain loss (or income) creates scope for pooling or 
diversifying of risks and how diversifying of risk converts uncertain loss (income) into 
certain loss (income). In other words, there is one-to-one relationship between pooling of 
risk and certainty of loss. 
 
This above analysis is highlighted to bring home the point that there need be no 
relation between the size of society (defined in terms of number of individuals) and scope 
for risk diversification. Loss could be certain in a small society or could be uncertain even 
in large society. Typically a society will be face different risks, loss from each risk may be 
uncertain. However, the aggregate loss from different risk may still be a certain amount if 
the two risks are combined. This has bearing on the design of insurance scheme. In the 
design of insurance, the risk covered by insurance could be so chosen as to reduce the loss 
uncertainty. This is particularly needed in a small pool managed in-house. 
 
(iii) Inpatient and Outpatient Care: Ideally, both these types of care should be available to 
the insured members. In case of illness the decision on whether or not the patient needs 
hospitalisation should be made professionally. It should not be a function of whether or not 
the  patient  has  health  insurance  cover.  In  practice  we  find  not  many  schemes  provide 
insurance for both types of risks. Most schemes provide for inpatient care only. In India out 
of  28  schemes  that  provide  health  insurance,  16  schemes  cover  only  hospitalisation 
expenses, 7 schemes cover only primary health care services and 5 schemes cover both 
primary health and hospitalisation costs. The reasons suggested for not providing outpatient 
care are varied: that people can, by and large, afford out-patient care because it is relatively  23 
inexpensive; it is the inpatient care that pushes them into poverty trap; that administratively 
it  is  difficult  to  include  out-patient  care;  and,  that  out-patient  care  would  lead  to  cost 
escalation.  
 
In the context of inpatient and outpatient care, three kinds of issues come up. These 
have to do with (a) affordability (b) renewal rate, and (c) spillover effect of outpatient care 
on inpatient care. We take each of these in turn.  
 
(a) Affordability is an important issue in providing health insurance to the poor. 
Inclusion of both these types of care in an insurance scheme can be costly for the poor. 
Given the limited paying capacity of the poor, if one must include only one of the cares then 
should it be outpatient care or inpatient care? We explore this issue here. 
 
Continuing with the case of risk averse agent, let there be now two types of risks 
being faced by the agent in period 2, while there is no risk in period 1. Let these risks be 
denoted by p and q, and the loss associated with these risks be denoted by L1 and L2 
respectively. Let p>q and L1<L2. Outpatient is generally high probability but low cost risk, 
while inpatient care is low probability and high costs risk. For the reason of comparability 
we assume that the probability and loss parameters are such that pL1=qL2. In words, the 
premium required to insure against each of these risks is the same. In the absence of any 
insurance, the agent’s expected utility is given as: 
 
EU= U(Y)+(1-p)(1-q) U(Y)+ p(1-q) U(Y-L1)+ (1-p)q U(Y-L2)+ p q U(Y-L1-L2) 
 
The issue is: if the agent can afford to insure for only one type of risk, what should 
that risk be? 
 
Let  P  (=  pL1  =  qL2)  denote  the  premium  amount  that  the  agent  must  pay  to 
insurance himself.  24 
 
In case the agent insures for outpatient care, his expected utility would be given as: 
 
U(Y-P) +(1-q)U(Y)+q U(Y-L2).....(A) 
 
In case the agent insures for inpatient care, his expected utility would be given as: 
 
U(Y-P) +(1-p)U(Y)+p U(Y-L1).....(B) 
 
A  comparison  of  (A)  and  (B)  suggests  that  for  (B)  to  be  greater  than  (A),  the 
following condition must hold: 
 




p U(Y-L1) - q U(Y-L2) > (p-q) U(Y) 
 
If the downside of the risk matters the most which is true in case of the poor, there is 
greater  likelihood  of  the  above  condition  holding  true  i.e.,  insurance  for  inpatient  care 
yielding higher utility than insurance for outpatient care. 
 
(b) Low membership renewal or high drop out rate is observed in many schemes. 
This could be due to number of reasons such as not benefiting from the scheme in any way, 
strict procedure for claims reimbursement, delays in reimbursement, denial of claims and so 
forth. One of the important reasons for high drop out rate is when members, after having 
joined a scheme, do not benefit from it in any way. There is a need to better understand high 
drop out rate in the context of high frequency, low cost risks (typically, outpatient care) and 
low frequency, high cost risks (typically, inpatient care). This is expected to be a serious  25 
problem in schemes that provide for hospitalisation or inpatient care and not in schemes 
that  provide  for  outpatient  care.  Typically,  a  scheme  bought  from  a  formal  insurance 
company provides only for inpatient care, and is likely to suffer from high drop out rate. 
 
While insurance in ex ante sense makes all the members better off, the members 
also evaluate benefits from insurance in ex post sense in deciding whether nor not to renew 
their  membership.  Typically,  at  the  time  of  renewal  of  membership  companies  give 
discounts to members who do not make any claim. The people, for whom the insurance 
concept is new, tend to perceive insurance different from those who understand the concept. 
For them, insurance is useless if they do not gain from it in ex post sense in the first few 
periods of their joining the scheme. Therefore, those who do not benefit tend to drop out 
from the scheme after first few years. Typically, hospitalisation is a low probability and 
high loss event. Supposing in a society of 100 individuals, the hospitalisation rate is 10 
percent  then,  on  an  average,  10  persons  would  benefit  from  insurance  against 
hospitalisation in any given period. Assuming that each time a different set of individuals 
need hospitalisation, it would take 10 years for all the members to benefit from the scheme. 
And before all the members can receive benefits some of them who are not the lucky ones 
(or not unlucky ones to need hospitalisation) to receive the benefit in the first few years may 
drop out. 
 
This way of perceiving insurance can be understood as follows. We continue with 
the assumptions of individual risk averse agent. In the absence of insurance the expected 
utility of the individual in a single period is: EU = (1-p) U (Y) + p U (Y-L). Supposing that 
p = 0.1 and that insurance is claimed by different sets of individuals each time. Under these 
assumptions, insurance scheme would take 10 (=1/p) periods (or years) for all members to 
benefit from it. The benefit from insurance is worked out as follow: 
  26 
Over 10-year period, each member is likely to incur loss only once (under the above 
assumptions). Each member would have paid premium during all 10 years. We ignore the 
discounting issue for simplicity. 
 
Individual’s utility over 10-year period is given by: [9 U (Y-p D)] + [U (Y-p D-
L+D)], where D denotes the level of insurance coverage bought. In this expression the first 
term denotes utility over 9 periods when the member paid premium but did not benefit 
while the second term denotes utility for a period when the member actually benefited from 
it. 
 
Assuming full coverage is sold to the agent (D=L), his utility after buying insurance 
would be: (1/p) U (Y-p L) = 10 U (Y-p L). 
 
On the other hand, if the individual had not joined the scheme his utility would have 
been: (1/p-1) U (Y)+ U (Y-L) = [9 U (Y)+ U (Y-L)]. 
 
Given this way of understanding insurance, the issue is how to design a scheme. The 
scheme should be designed in such a way that perceived benefit from joining a scheme is 
greater than not joining it i.e., [(1/p) U (Y-p L)] > [(1/p-1) U(Y) + U(Y-L)]. This condition 
can be rewritten as: 
 
[U (Y-p L) – U (Y-L)] > (1/p-1) [U (Y) - U (Y-p L)] 
 
As can be seen from above, if the probability of illness is higher there is greater 
likelihood of the above inequality holding true. This then is the rationale for bundling risks 
(high frequency events), against which insurance is provided, in such a way as to ensure 
that the above inequality holds ex post sufficiently early for each individual joining the 
scheme. 
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The  problem of high dropout is pronounced where insurance is bought from an 
insurance company i.e., in the intermediary type case. Insurance scheme that is managed in-
house is less likely to suffer from this problem as there is high degree of solidarity among 
the members. In the provider type scheme, the problem of high drop out is generally not the 
case. 
 
The problem of high dropout rate can also be viewed as a problem of discounting 
i.e., of the degree of impatience. The higher the discount rate the higher is the degree of 
impatience. The poor who grapple with meeting their day-to-day needs generally tend to 
discount future much more heavily than the non-poor. Given higher discount rate of the 
poor, a health insurance scheme must be so designed as to be able to provide benefits to 
maximum number members within few years. One of the ways is to introduced outpatient 
care, another way could be to organise free health camps (for health check ups, eye camps) 
so that all the members benefit from their joining an insurance scheme. Yet another way to 
minimise  the  chances  of  members  dropping  out  from  a  health  insurance  scheme  is  to 
provide insurance against other kinds of risks such as death, accident as well. Indeed, in 
some schemes integrated insurance that includes insurance against other risk is offered, and 
SEWA is a good example of it. 
 
SEWA has reported the claims rate (defined as number of claims per 1000 members 
per year) in case of health have varied between 15 and 23. In other words the probability of 
claims has been between 0.015 and 0.023. Since SEWA offers integrated insurance product, 
health claims form only a part of total claims. When the frequency of health shocks or 
illness is not very high, people may not feel tempted to join group insurance. However, if 
the risks are bundled in such a way that the frequency of the health risks covered by the 
scheme is high, that would attract people to the scheme. 
 
(c) Outpatient care has spillover effect on inpatient care. If the need for outpatient 
care  is  addressed  along  with  inpatient  care,  it  tends  to  reduce  the  hospitalisation  rate.  28 
Conversely, if outpatient care is left unaddressed, the cost of insuring inpatient care would 
tend to be higher. One of the ways of addressing outpatient care is, of course, through 
insurance. In case of health provider insurance scheme (Type III), it is relatively easy to 
cover  both  inpatient  and  outpatient  care.  The  most  difficult  type  of  microinsurance 
arrangement is where formal insurance provider enters into the picture. Where a community 
or an NGO manages the scheme, outpatient care too can be included but the danger is on 
the other side, that is, of not providing a cover for many types of inpatient care because of 
its high costs and greater risks. 
 
Another possible way, which once again underscores the role of a nodal agency, is 
to  have  a  provision  of  soft  loan  for  outpatient  care.  In  one  of  the  UNDP  sponsored 
experiments  in  India  outpatient  care  is  addressed  by  providing  soft  loans  to  members 
through self-help groups.
22 In some cases primary health care centres that are supposed to 
provide free primary health care services have been strengthened in areas where insurance 
scheme has been launched. 
 
(iv) Benefits on Provision Side: To the extent that a grouping of clients (patients) helps in 
getting a better deal from the health care provider(s), organising an insurance scheme would 
help  all  the  scheme  members.  The  insurance  scheme  that  is  managed  by  health  care 
provider is most beneficial to the members as provider tends to cross-subsidise low-income 
patients. In that case, the cost of medical services is lowered by joining insurance scheme 
than by staying out. Also, health care provision exhibits economies of scale i.e., cost of 
health care by a provider falls as more individuals avail medical services. The economies of 
scale exist because of the presence of fixed costs (cost of medical equipment etc.). Cost of 
health care comes down as more and more people seek health services. Health insurance by 
making the cost of health care affordable helps in increasing demand for health services. 
                                                            
22   The UNDP has sponsored three different health insurance experiments for the poor in India, two of which 
are in state of Karnataka and one in W. Bengal state. In one of the experiments (which is in T. Narasipura 
region  in  Karnataka),  the  issue  of  outpatient  care  too  has  been  addressed  not  through  insurance  but 
through (soft) credit.   29 
Note that even when there is no further scope of risk diversification by increasing group 
size (and this happens when size of loss remains fixed in a society), increasing the size of 
the pool still is advantageous because of economies of scale in health care provision.
23 
Continuing  with  the  earlier  notations,  expected  utility  of  an  agent  in  the  absence  of 
insurance is (1-p) U(Y) + p U(Y-L0), where L0  denotes the loss amount. However, after 
joining  an  insurance  scheme  the  member  now  benefits  in  two  ways:  one  benefit  is,  of 
course, from transferring risk, and the other benefit is of lowering of premium on account of 
special discounts that an insurance provider or a nodal agency can negotiate with the health 
provider (due to the presence of economies of scale). The second type of benefit may or 
may not be available to the non-members. Thus,  
 
[(1-p) U(Y) + p U(Y-L0)] < U(Y-pL0) < U(Y-pL1). 
 
This is because L1<L0, due to cheaper cost of treatment in the event of illness after 
joining insurance scheme. As mentioned above, this benefit is likely to be present in the 
provider type schemes, and could take the form of inclusion of outpatient care for the price 
(or premium) of inpatient care. However, if this could also be availed by the other two 
scheme types then the scheme would tend to attract higher membership and also experience 
lower dropout rate. 
 
(v) Loss/risk reduction: Insurance provision per se does not lead to any loss reduction in a 
society. It only redistributes financial consequences of loss across insured individuals. It 
might  sometimes  discourage  loss  reduction  when  it  leads  to  moral  hazard  problem 
(discussed later in the text). Loss/risk reduction can be of two kinds: one where the benefits 
                                                            
23   An important issue that comes up when discussing the issue of fixed costs is the appropriate form of 
subsidising a scheme. In a scheme in Ghana, the donors gave subsidy in the form of capital/medical 
equipment. Even some of the administrative costs are borne by the donors. The premium cost is used to 
cover variable medical expenses only. Is incurring the fixed cost the best way of giving subsidy? If there 
is no principal-agent (or the agency) problem, then it may be a better way of giving subsidy. If the 
principal-agent problem exists, giving subsidy to meet fixed costs may reduce incentives of the organisers 
to enlarge the pool and thereby to reduce interest cost on the borrowed capital for buying fixed equipment.  30 
of loss/risk reduction are fully internalised, and two, where reduction activity by any single 
individual benefits other members of the society as well. Generally, insurance contracts are 
designed  to  encourage  loss/risk  reduction.  In  situations  where  the  benefits  of  loss/risk 
reduction  are  fully  internalised  (where  there  are  no  benefits  to  any  other  person  from 
loss/risk reduction by any individual), insurance can be so designed as to encourage loss / 
risk reduction among the insured individuals. For example, a limit on the maximum number 
of claims from a single family can help in this regard. But loss/risk reduction activities 
having positive externalities are in the nature of public good, and therefore justify state or 
collective action. In the presence of positive externalities in loss/risk reduction, it may be 
worthwhile for a nodal agency to invest some resources in such activities. To be beneficial 
to the insured members, the amount spent on loss reduction by a nodal agency should be 
less  than  the  gains  to  the  insurance  provider  from  spending  on  claims.  The  higher  the 
membership  from  any  particular  geographical  region,  the  greater  will  be  the  scope  for 
undertaking such loss/risk reduction activities, especially if the non-members are difficult to 
exclude from the benefits. This way insurance enables loss reduction that otherwise would 
not take place due to collective action problem. Scope for loss / risk reduction is likely to be 
greater  in  schemes  managed  in-house  and  in  the  provider  type  schemes.  Provider  type 
schemes tend to be more geographically concentrated than the other two. 
 
(vi) Informational Problems: Asymmetric information between the insurer and the insured 
members and also with the health care providers gives rise to the moral hazard and adverse 
selection problem. In low resource setting there is a limit to which premium can be based 
on the risk profile of individuals. Premium rate is determined on community basis but the 
premium amount collected could vary depending on the family size. When premium is 
based on community rating, low-risk members tends to cross-subsidise high risk members. 
Given this, the low-risk members may not feel inclined to join or may tend to drop out after 
joining. This tends to reduce the membership size. Appropriate choice of unit of insurance 
or of membership can introduce an element of compulsion. Introducing some element of 
compulsion in membership, for example, having family as opposed to individual as a unit  31 
of membership, can mitigate the adverse selection problem.
24 The moral hazard problem in 
taking  preventive  care  as  well  as  with  the  over-consumption  of  medical  services  can 
potentially exist in microinsurance schemes. In schemes that provide for wage loss there is 
a tendency among patients to seek hospitalisation even for minor illnesses. Similarly, the 
schemes in which outpatient care is not addressed, this tendency is likely to be higher. 
Addressing  outpatient  care  (either  through  insurance  or  otherwise)  will  tend  to  check 
against the tendency to get hospitalised when it is not required. An insurance contract can 
be so designed as to not encourage or to mitigate the moral hazard problem. Introducing co-
payments is one of the ways of reducing the problem but co-payments also can impose a 
barrier. The manager type (Type II) or the provider type (Type III) schemes generally suffer 
less from such problems. 
 
(vii) Maternity Care: Maternity care is generally considered separate or distinct from other 
forms of medical care/treatment. This is so because this condition is not totally independent 
in the same sense as other illnesses are, and it affects well identified section of population. 
Since  this  condition  is  the  outcome  of  conscious  family  planning,  and  in  some  sense 
predictable, this is sometimes excluded from the benefit provided in an insurance scheme. 
Also, since no gender distinction is made with respect to the premium amount, inclusion of 
this  benefit  results  in  unintended  cross-subsidy.  This  may  tend  to  reduce  the  size  of 
membership.  In  a  scheme  where  family  is  the  unit  of  insurance  or  where  insurance  is 
exclusively of women members as in case of SHEPHERD, maternity care can be included. 
In these cases, the cross subsidy element is unlikely to be significant as to dissuade the 
population from joining the scheme. Where the unit of membership is individuals and the 
scheme is common for both men and women, maternity care should be provided an add-on 
option to the insured women members. In SEWA insurance scheme, over 75 percent of the 
                                                            
24   The  unit  of  insurance  could  be  an  individual,  family/household  or  even  the  entire  village  or  the 
community. Health insurance arrangement involving formal insurance provider generally is sensitive to 
the size of family members, even if it allows for family/household membership, whereas the community or 
an NGO managed schemes tend to disregard family size. A case where family, as opposed to individual, 
as unit of insurance reduces membership is given in Ahuja and Juetting (2003). 
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members  are  women  and  they  are  offered  distinct  insurance  package.  The  package  is 
integrated as it covers risk of death, accident along with risk of illness. Even so, maternity 
benefit is excluded from this standard package.
25 
 
Maternity  insurance  is  one  option.  Another  option  especially  when  an  event  is 
somewhat predictable is having a separate fund that can be used to give loan or credit. 
SHEPHERD has created a fund called Sugam fund for extending financial assistance to 




4  Role of Government  
One of the main policy issues here is the consideration of how much, if any, subsidy 
be provided by government, and how should it applied. In a social sector like health, there 
is a clear justification of subsidy to the low-income people. To the extent the development 
of health insurance helps in mobilising some resources from the low-income members, it 
reduces  the  need  for  subsidy  in  an  area  traditionally  considered  to  be  the  exclusive 
responsibility  of  government.  But  development  of  microinsurance  doesn’t  mean  that 
government is spared of its responsibility. The experience with micro health insurance in 
the country suggests that sustainability of the existing schemes critically depends on some 
external  funding.  Therefore,  providing  subsidy  is  essential  for  upscaling/replicating  of 
similar schemes. 
 
                                                            
25   Members can pay premium in two different ways. Either annual premium or they could make a fixed 
deposit in their account and the interest income on the fixed amount can go towards paying their premium. 
Insurance against maternity care is given as incentives to encourage women to go for the fixed deposit 
option for paying premium. Fixed deposit option links well with the savings and lending activities of 
SEWA and also guarantees membership renewal. 
26   SHEPHERD found the rural women to be prone to many medical problems. In particular, women aged 
above forty are frequently affected by many gynecological and other illnesses that drive them to spend 
more on health.  33 
Important  issues  here  are  what  should  be  the  appropriate  form  of  subsidy  and 
through whom should it be channeled? 
 
There is a need for increasing public subsidy to the health sector which currently 
accounts for just 0.9 percent of GDP, as well as for reorienting the existing subsidy towards 
preventive and promotive care that mainly benefit the poor rather than curative care that 
benefits the richer sections of society as well.
27 Providing health security to the poor calls 
for tackling both outpatient care and inpatient care needs simultaneously. More so, when 
outpatient care has a positive spillover effect on the inpatient rate. Either primary health 
care should be provided free or could be integrated with subsidised health insurance scheme 
for the inpatient care. In health care provider (Type III) scheme the integration can be easily 
effected. But in other two types of schemes this would depend on the administrative ease. 
 
The  first  claimant  of  subsidy  is  the  outpatient  care.  For  inpatient  care,  the 
contributory  capacity  of  the  poor  needs  to  be  established  and  harnessed.  In  providing 
insurance for the inpatient care, perhaps the best way to subsidise is by way of transaction 
costs and, perhaps, the best agency to channel subsidy is through a nodal agency. Such 
subsidy  could  be  linked  to  the  number  of  individuals  who  participate  in  the  insurance 
scheme. Providing subsidy to health care provider tends to be non-specific and lowers the 
negotiating  capacity  of  a  nodal  agency  in  developing  an  insurance  scheme  that  is  not 
initiated by health care provider. Similarly, providing subsidy to insurance provider may 
help  in  offering  attractive  insurance  package  (higher  benefits  at  a  given  premium)  but 
leaves the issue of transaction costs unattended which can become a barrier to increasing 
enrolment/membership. 
 
                                                            
27   Primary health care centres that are supposed to provide free primary health care services are currently in 
pathetic conditions in most states. Public subsidies to secondary, and tertiary health facilities needs to be 
redirected  to  strengthen  primary  health  care  facilities,  and  providing  subsidy  for  developing  health 
insurance arrangement for inpatient care.  34 
Another major policy issue is: what is the best way to guide the development of the 
microinsurance  activity  through  appropriate  policy/regulation.  The  current  regulation  of 
making it mandatory for all insurance companies to underwrite certain percentage of its 
business  from  rural  and  social  sector  is,  perhaps,  not  the  best  way  to  handle  it.  Note, 
however, that the present regulations do not call for subsidising such policies. For-profit 
insurance companies try to maximise their profits even on insurance contracts sold to the 
low-income people. With very little prior experience, insurance companies are making good 
profits even on such policies. This is partly because the claims are low in the formative 
years due to weak information, education, and communication while the premium rates are 
calculated on actuarial basis. Indeed, on some schemes offered to the poor the insurance 
companies, including public insurance companies, ended up making fantastic profits. What 
is the point of giving subsidy if the subsidy ends up in the hands of insurance companies 
(both public and private) in the form of profits!
28 The best way, perhaps, would be if an 
insurer could be organised along the lines of mutual company where the profits, if any, are 
redistributed among policyholders. A single entity dedicated to providing insurance for all 
risks facing the poor can also ensure certain minimum level of health security to the poor. 
Extending health insurance is not an objective in itself. The objective is to build certain 
decent  level  of  health  security  through  insurance.  Currently,  the  annual  premium  per 
member ranges between Rs. 20 to Rs. 360 and the benefits range from Rs. 1,250 (plus 
primary health care) to Rs. 30,000 (plus primary health care). 
 
5  Conclusions 
Microinsurance that deals with insurance for the poor is emerging in India. This is 
partly the result of policy intervention and partly due to the development of micro-finance 
activity in the country. In extending the reach of insurance to the poor, the role of nodal 
agency is deemed crucial. In this paper while bringing out the role of nodal agency in 
extending health insurance, we discuss how health insurance for the poor is different from 
                                                            
28   In all the three UNDP experiments the claims ratio is reported to be very low, resulting in good profits to 
the public insurance company that offered health insurance contracts.  35 
health insurance in general. Depending on the functions that a nodal agency performs, all 
microinsurance  arrangements  taking  roots  in  the  country  can be categorized in to three 
distinct types: intermediate type, manager type and provider type. Each type has its own 
strengths  and  weaknesses.  All  these  types  may  be  appropriate  for  a  large  and  diverse 
country like India. We analyse selected conceptual issues that are generic to all types of 
health insurance initiatives as well as those that are specific to a particular type. A good 
understanding of these issues is important to remove some of the weakness in the design of 
these schemes. More empirical studies are needed to further our understanding of these 
schemes so that these schemes can be shaped better. 
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Appendix 
 
Supposing a risk averse utility maximising agent is faced with two possible states of nature: a good 
state,  whose  probability  is  denoted  by  (1-p),  in  which his income is y and a bad state whose 
probability is p, in which he experiences a loss of L. The bad state represents the state when the 
agent falls sick and therefore has to spend part of his income on healthcare to pull himself out of 
sickness. Faced with this situation, agent’s expected utility is given as: (1-p)U(W)+p U(W-L), 
where the first term represents agent’s utility in good state and the second term represents his 
utility in bad state. If this agent is given a choice to buy insurance at an actuarially fair price, the 
standard result in the literature shows that the agent would buy full insurance.
29 His utility after the 
purchase of insurance would be given as: U(W-p L), where pL denotes the premium paid by the 
agent. In the event of insurance, the amount spent by the agent on his healthcare would be fully 
reimbursed to him by the insurance company. Hence, the agent experiences no income loss beyond 
paying pL as premium. The agent is thus better off with insurance than without it. This is reflected 
in terms of the utility. The utility the agent gets after the purchase of insurance is greater than 
without it, i.e., U (W-p L) > (1-p)U(W)+p U(W-L). Note that the premium amount does not include 
any  transaction  costs  that  the  agency  providing  insurance  may  have  incurred.  If  we  include 
transaction  cost,  the  agent  may  still  buy  insurance  provided  such  costs  are  within  certain 
“reasonable” limits. High transaction costs can make insurance unattractive to the agent, and in 
such  situation  the  agent  may  be  better  off  pursuing  alternate  risk  management  strategies  than 





















                                                            
29   Price of insurance is actuarially fair when the price per unit of insurance coverage is equal to the loss 
probability. This price includes no transaction costs. Typically, insurance companies charge higher than 
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In the above figure, point E represents the situation before the agent buys insurance. The level of 
utility or satisfaction that the agent gets in the absence of insurance is represented by the curve UU’ 
(the further away this curve is from the origin the greater is the utility obtained by the agent). This 
is called indifference curve because the agent is indifferent between any two points on this curve. 
Now, suppose EF represents the price line faced by the agent when insurance is available to him at 
actuarially fair price. Faced with this price line the agent would choose full insurance and move on 
to the point where the line EF intersects with the 45
0 line. By purchasing insurance the agent moves 
on  the  higher  indifference  curve.  Note  that  the  actuarially  fair  price  does  not  include  any 
transaction costs. Generally, insurance companies do build this cost in any insurance program. 
Supposing costs charged by insurance company is denoted by EE’. The new price line now would 
be E’F’. If the agent can choose the coverage level, he would again buy full insurance and move on 
the point where the line E’F’ intersects with the 45
0 line, thereby still getting higher utility with 
insurance than without it. However, in case of insurance to the low-income people differs in the 
sense that it is a group contract and not an individual contract. Typically, in a CBHI an insurance 
scheme is developed and offered to the entire community and not to any single individual. A group 
member does not have freedom to choose any coverage level. The only choice that any of the 
community members has is whether or not to buy insurance. The main idea behind designing CBHI 
is to keep the costs low so as to make it affordable. Given the transaction costs, if the coverage 
level is on any point represented by the segment E’R, the agent would not buy insurance. However, 
even if the coverage level is such as to fall on the segment represented by the point R and the 45
0 
line (the agent is better off with insurance), the agent may still not find it attractive then alternate 
strategies such as self-insurance or savings for the risky (bad) state. Hence the need to keep the 
transaction costs low. 
 
 
 